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Abstract
In metaphysics, there are a number of distinct but related questions about the existence of
“further facts”—facts that are contingent relative to the physical structure of the universe. These
include further facts about qualia, personal identity, and time. In this article I provide a se-
quence of examples involving computer simulations, ranging from one in which the protagonist
can clearly conclude such further facts exist to one that describes our own condition. This raises
the question of where along the sequence (if at all) the protagonist stops being able to soundly
conclude that further facts exist.
Keywords: metaphysics, philosophy of mind, epistemology.
Case A. Fonda has just attended an inspiring department colloquium. On her way out, she absent-
mindedly takes a wrong turn and wanders into a computer lab. She approaches one of the computers.
∗This paper appears in Erkenntnis (DOI: 10.1007/s10670-018-9979-6) and is also available as arXiv:1802.01161.
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On it, a simulation of a number of humanoid agents in a virtual universe is being run. The perspective
of one of these agents—call it Alpha—is continuously displayed on the monitor. Fonda is enthralled
and continues to watch from Alpha’s perspective. Because Alpha takes a large variety of interesting
actions in the simulated universe, it does not take Fonda long to learn the laws of physics governing
it. Moreover, Fonda—whose undergraduate degree was in computer science—can easily imagine
how one would write the code for simulating the environment according to these laws. Then, she
has the following thought. There must be some additional code, beyond the code that executes the
simulated universe’s laws of physics (and the code that gives its initial conditions). Namely, there
must also be some code that governs the displaying of Alpha’s perspective on the screen. This ad-
ditional code could in principle be changed without changing any of the code governing the physics
and the initial conditions. For example, what is currently displayed as red on the monitor could be
displayed as blue instead, by changing only the code governing the display. As another example,
this code could be changed to display the perspective of a different agent instead. (It is possible that
the other monitors in the lab display the perspectives of the other agents—she has not checked—but
even so, one could change which agent’s perspective gets displayed on which screen.) Alterna-
tively, the code could be changed to display nothing at all (with the simulation nevertheless running
unchanged). Fonda thus concludes there are some “further facts” to this universe, in that there is
additional code beyond that governing the laws of physics and the initial conditions. This additional
code is, in a sense, contingent relative to the other code.1
The “further facts” that Fonda concludes are present in Case A are related to those considered in
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the literature on metaphysics and philosophy of mind. The first example of a further fact in the case
is related to qualia and the possibility of inverted spectra.2 It especially relates to strong versions
of the inverted spectrum scenario where qualia do not supervene on the physical, i.e., where two
microphysically identical twins nevertheless have inverted spectra. Stated otherwise, a variant of
the question for which the case above is arguably especially relevant is: did the laws of our universe
(and its initial conditions3) necessitate that when I see red things they phenomenally appear the way
they do, or would they have allowed for them to appear the way blue things do now? Whether the
phenomenal nature of color perception is contingent (holding fixed the physical laws of our universe
and its initial conditions) has been the subject of much philosophical debate. Fonda’s question is
clearly related, though it would seem that in her case she is entirely right to conclude that the way
things in the simulated universe appear to her is contingent, even holding fixed the physical laws
and initial conditions of the simulated universe. The analogy between Fonda’s questions in Case A
and the standard ones from the metaphysics and philosophy of mind literature breaks down at some
points, and we will explore this in what follows. Before we do so, let us consider the other example,
Fonda’s question of why it is Alpha, and not some other agent, whose perspective is displayed. This
is related to questions in metaphysics about personal identity and the self. Most closely, it is related
to the question of whether “I could have been someone else,” and the closely related question of
whether it is contingent that this perspective is the present one.4
Another type of further fact that could be included in the discussion is that of further facts about
time. Fonda might ask herself why this point in the simulation’s timeline is being displayed to
her right now, as opposed to another point in simulated time. Also, she might ask herself why the
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simulation runs at the rate that it does, as opposed to (say) twice as fast.5 Here, it may not be clear
that things could have been different. For example, perhaps the simulation simply started running
when the program was first executed and it is running at the fastest possible rate on the hardware
provided. On the other hand, the entire simulation may have been precomputed from beginning
to end, so that a type of block universe is already stored in computer memory and Fonda is just
watching a replay of some part of it. In this case, there must indeed be some further code governing
which temporal part is replayed and at which rate the replay runs. While I believe that the cases
presented here may indeed provide some helpful insights for the metaphysics of time, things are
clearer for the other types of further facts. Hence, I will avoid discussion of time in what follows.
We are now ready to introduce the next case.
Case B. This case proceeds similarly to Case A, though with an important difference. Instead of
plain monitors, the computer lab now has sophisticated virtual reality (VR) headsets. Fonda puts
on one of these that shows her the perspective of Alpha. The VR system is so remarkably good
that Fonda spends a long time using it and becomes completely engrossed—so engrossed that she
completely forgets the world outside the simulation, her own identity in it, and, we may suppose,
even basic facts such as what the color of grass is, or even the existence of such a thing as grass at
all (assuming there is no such thing in the simulated universe). All that is left to her is the simula-
tion, displayed from Alpha’s perspective—so that presumably she feels rather identified with Alpha.
Again, she quickly learns the laws of physics in this universe. Then she has the following thought.
There must be further facts to this universe, namely the ones concerning my own perspective in it.
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The (simulated) sky could have appeared to me in the color in which the (simulated) ground appears
to me now, without the fundamental laws of the universe changing. Moreover, there must be further
facts regarding my identity—why is it this perspective that appears (to me6) and not that of some
other agent?
Finally, Case C returns to day-to-day life.
Case C. In this version, Fonda does not walk into any computer lab; she just walks outside and ex-
periences the world as we normally do. She knows the laws of physics well from her undergraduate
studies and nothing in the world seems mysterious to her (unresolved questions in physics aside).
Then, she has a thought just like the one in Case B, but now about our own familiar universe. Why
does the sky appear to me the way it does? Why is it this perspective that appears (to me)? There
must be further facts beyond the laws of physics and any initial conditions.
In each case, Fonda reaches the conclusion that there are further facts to the universe at hand.
In which of these cases is her conclusion justified? It is worth emphasizing that the question is not
whether there are actually further facts, but rather whether the reasoning that leads her to conclude
this is sound. In the same way as it is possible to give a wrong proof for a (true) theorem, in principle
Fonda’s belief in further facts can fail to be justified even if there are in fact further facts in these
cases. Now, there are four possibilities:
1. Her reasoning is not sound in Case A.
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2. Her reasoning is sound in Case A, but not in Case B.
3. Her reasoning is sound in Case B, but not in Case C.
4. Her reasoning is sound in Case C.
It is straightforward to check that these four options are exhaustive in the sense that at least one of
them must hold.7 One may of course choose Option 4, having been convinced by the sequence of
cases (or already believing prior to picking up this paper) that we are justified in concluding that there
are further facts in our own world. I have little to say that is new about advantages and disadvantages
of such a view, so the remainder of the paper is devoted to the following question. If we believe that
Option 4 is false, then which of the first three options is most plausible? In what follows, I argue
that Option 2 is the most appealing of the three, though attempts to decisively establish it as correct
lead us to variants of known arguments about qualia and personal identity. The exercise does cast a
new light on these arguments, in particular clarifying some of their epistemological aspects. It also
demonstrates commonalities among various types of putative further facts that I believe have not
been sufficiently appreciated in the literature.
Option 1: Fonda’s reasoning in Case A is not sound
This, to me, seems the least appealing option of the three, so I will not spend much space on it.
Fonda’s reasoning seems entirely sound to me: if the simulation is displaying on the monitor, there
must in fact be some code that governs this display. It would certainly be possible to write code for
the simulation without any instructions to display anything on the screen, but then the simulation
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would just run silently8 on the machine without any output. This is in fact a mistake programmers
make on occasion: they write the code (for, say, computing 2n as a function of n) correctly but
forget to write instructions to display the result to (say) the screen. Such a mistake is typically easily
corrected by adding a line to the code.9
One could argue for Option 1 by arguing that in fact, there are no further facts in Case A. Such
an argument might proceed as follows.
We should distinguish between two claims. One is that the qualia associated with seeing
an object supervene (only) on facts about the physical properties of that object. Let us
call these the “narrow” physical facts. The other is that they supervene on facts about
the physical properties of the object being viewed, those of the observer viewing the
object, and those of anything else mediating the viewing. Let us call these, collectively,
the “broad” physical facts. The former claim is untenable, for example because the
qualia are different when the observer is color blind or the air between the object and
the observer is hazy. It is the latter claim that is of interest. And in Case A, the broad
physical facts include facts about the code governing the display, the monitor itself,
Fonda’s eyes and brain, etc. Hence, there is no reason to think that there are any further
facts in Case A.
However, this argument relies on misunderstanding the sense in which the phrase “further fact” is be-
ing used here, which is quite modest. The point is that Fonda’s experience, or even just what appears
on the monitor, is not fully determined by the physical—in the sense of the simulated physics—facts
of the simulated universe. These include facts about the simulated objects, Alpha, and anything
7
mediating the viewing within the simulated universe. They do not include physical (in the common
sense) facts about the monitor, Fonda’s body, and the space between them. They also do not include
facts about the additional code governing the display. Again, the relevant physics is the physics of
the simulation, not the physics of the broader world.10 It is clear that there are further facts in Case
A in the modest sense of being contingent relative to just the facts about the simulated physics, and
this modest sense is the one of interest in this paper. Why this interpretation is the one of interest is
made clear by considering the analogous move of using an immodest interpretation in Case C. This
move would result in arguments such as the following.
Even if experiences were had by souls outside the world through some process medi-
ating between brains in the world and souls outside it, then we should simply consider
a broader physics that includes the souls and the mediating process. By doing so the
experiences again supervene on the broader physical facts, so there is still no evidence
for further facts.
Clearly this argument is unsatisfactory; in arguing against further facts, we mean to argue against
the existence of things such as extraworldly souls, not to accommodate them through a technical
maneuver. While all this may seem rather obvious, it is important to keep straight, especially in
Case B, where the relevant physics is still the physics of the simulation—which, in that case, is the
only physics of which Fonda is aware.
I will now skip to Option 3 before returning to Option 2.
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Option 3: Fonda’s reasoning is sound in Case B but not in Case C
While this option seems more appealing to me than Option 1, it still seems difficult to argue for
it. Key to this difficulty, of course, is that by assumption, Fonda has forgotten everything about the
outside world in Case B. If she retains some memory of the outside world, the case will reduce to
one that is not substantively different from Case A.
Is Case B substantively different from Case C? Of course: in Case B the universe under consid-
eration is a simulation in a larger universe. But are the two cases substantively different in terms
of Fonda’s epistemic situation? This is what seems difficult to argue. Whether we have reason to
believe that we are not a brain in a vat or (in) a computer simulation is a topic that has been explored
at length in the literature. Bostrom (2003) has argued that there is a large probability that we are in
fact in a computer simulation, under some assumptions including that posthuman civilizations are
likely to be reached and likely to run a large number of such simulations. In contrast, Markosian
(2014) has argued that all the evidence speaks in favor of the external world being real; evidence in
favor of being a brain in a vat would be exemplified by a major glitch in the simulated environment.
For our purposes, it is not necessary to resolve this debate. What matters is not whether Fonda is
justified in believing that the world around her is real (in the sense of not being a simulation) in
either Case B or C, but rather whether there is a substantive difference between these two cases in
terms of her epistemic situation.
Let us simply assume that there are no glitches in Case B. Furthermore, at least in principle,
the simulation in Case B could provide Fonda with a very rich experience. As Case B has been
described so far, Fonda is not able to take actions in it; she is just observing. This indeed constitutes
9
a difference between what Fonda observes in Cases B and C. It is not immediately clear to me
whether and how this particular difference is relevant to the soundness of her argument for further
facts. In any case, we can easily modify the example to give her some control over Alpha’s actions
(with perhaps other human beings who similarly wandered into labs controlling the other agents in
the simulation).
Perhaps more interestingly, she may wonder about the place of her own thoughts in the simulated
universe. In our own world, we have reasons to believe that our thoughts are generated by our brains.
If a similar account does not seem reasonable in the simulated universe—for example, because there
does not seem to be any physical structure in it capable of generating these thoughts—she may
conclude that such a structure must exist somewhere outside of her observable universe, and from
there it is a short step to conclude the existence of further facts. Then again, we could modify the
example so that there appear to be brains inside the simulated agents; we could even go so far as
to imagine that, unbeknownst to Fonda, her brain is being scanned while she is standing in the lab,
and what goes on in it is then reflected in Alpha’s simulated brain.11 (A similar idea is described
by Chalmers (2005).)
Overall, it seems difficult to draw a sharp distinction between Fonda’s epistemic situation in
Cases B and C that cannot be addressed with a simple modification of the cases.12 Of course, this is
precisely the point of Case B, to make Fonda’s epistemic situation in it essentially identical to that
in Case C; and if we can in fact succeed at this, then Option 3 fails. This leaves us with Option 2.
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Option 2: Fonda’s reasoning is sound in Case A but not in Case B
This appears to me the most attractive of the three options. A first attempt at an argument proceeds
as follows. In Case A, Fonda recognizes (say) that the color of the sky in the simulation is the
same as the color of grass in the outside world (i.e., green), whereas it could just as well have been
displayed as the color of the sky in the outside world (i.e., blue). That is, the correspondence between
colors in the simulation (as displayed on the screen) and colors in the outside world clearly could
have been different, without the code that governs the laws of physics and the initial conditions
in the simulation being any different. Thus there is clearly a “further fact” present, consisting in
the additional code that governs how a perspective is displayed on the monitor. In Case B, however,
Fonda cannot recognize the existence of any such correspondence, because she no longer remembers
the outside world. Hence—so the argument goes—she cannot conclude further facts exist.
Now, this argument does not seem entirely satisfactory to me. Even in Case B, it seems entirely
possible for Fonda to imagine a scenario where the color of the sky (in the simulation, though she
does not know it is a simulation) would be the color that the grass is now (in the simulation), and
vice versa. This is the familiar inverted spectrum scenario, except in this case, by virtue of all this
taking place in a virtual reality system, it is clearly true that the spectrum could be inverted; all this
would require is some changes to the code governing the display. Nevertheless, it is still possible
that Fonda’s belief that the spectrum could have been inverted is not justified. Having forgotten
about the outside world, she certainly does not know about the simple mechanism—changing a few
lines of code in the outside world—by which the spectrum could indeed be inverted. But few would
argue that awareness of a specific mechanism by which the spectrum could be inverted is necessary
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to justify belief in the possibility of an inverted spectrum (though it is clearly sufficient).
Nevertheless, it seems that the physicalist, arguing that Fonda’s belief is not justified, has ar-
guments available in Case B that are unavailable in Case A. The physicalist can argue that Fonda
cannot be sure that experiential properties corresponding to her seeing the simulated sky are not,
at bottom, physical properties. (Again, here, “physical” refers to the physics of the environment,
which we happen to know is simulated but she does not.) Even in our own case (Case C), fleshing
out such an argument and addressing immediate counterarguments requires substantial work; see,
for example, Hawthorne (2002). But I do not see that any additional obstacles to such an argument
are introduced when moving from Case C to Case B. In contrast, in Case A such an argument be-
comes untenable. In that case, Fonda clearly knows that the experiential properties corresponding to
her seeing the simulated sky are not, at bottom, properties of the simulated physics; she knows that
the code governing the display, the monitor itself, her eyes and brain, etc., are also involved.
So, perhaps this all reduces to standard arguments about inverted spectra. Perhaps Fonda cannot
reasonably reject the possibility that the way colors appear to her necessarily emerges from the
laws of her universe. If so, it at least suggests that the debate on inverted spectra has been on
the right track. But it also provides a clearer lens on these arguments.13 This is because unlike
in the standard inverted spectrum scenario, in this case it is clearly true that the spectrum could
have been inverted. This, I believe, reduces the intuitive appeal of the argument that which quale
appears must supervene upon properties of the physical world (and that therefore a strong type of
inverted spectrum is not possible). It makes it clear that if this argument is to succeed, it should be
fundamentally epistemological in nature: it should argue just that we cannot know that there is no
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such supervenience. At least, this is so if our epistemic situation is sufficiently like that of Fonda in
Case B, and it appears that it is, as discussed in the previous section.
It is useful to note that even slightly nudging Case B towards Case A—for example, allowing
Fonda to remember only that she is in a simulation, but effectively nothing else about the outside
world, including even whether her color experiences there were anything like the ones she is experi-
encing now—would again allow her to soundly conclude that an inverted spectrum in her simulated
world is a genuine possibility. This is why it is important to be strict about Fonda not remembering
anything in Case B.
Next, let us consider further facts about personal identity and the self. Again, in Case A, Fonda
can soundly conclude that there are further facts about how the perspectives of agents in the simu-
lation are assigned to monitors in the outside world. Even if every agent’s perspective is displayed
on some monitor, clearly the correspondence—on which particular monitor each agent’s perspec-
tive is displayed—could have been different, without the code that governs the laws of physics
and the initial conditions of the simulation being any different. Thus there is clearly a further fact
present, consisting in the additional code that governs on which (if any) monitors each perspective
is displayed. Again, however, in Case B, Fonda cannot recognize the existence of any such corre-
spondence, because she no longer remembers the outside world. So one might argue that in Case B
she is not justified in believing in the existence of further facts about personal identity and the self.
How satisfying is this argument? Could she nevertheless, in Case B, imagine the perspective of
an agent other than Alpha appearing to her? Certainly it is true that a different agent’s perspective
could be made to appear to her; all this would require is a change to the code governing which
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perspective is displayed by the VR system. But would she be justified in believing that a different
perspective could have appeared to her? Again, it seems that the moment we allow her to remember
even just the mere fact that she is in a simulation, even if she remembers nothing else about her
identity in the outside world, she can indeed conclude that a different agent’s perspective could have
been made to appear to her. But we explicitly rule out such a memory in Case B. Hence, it is not clear
that the notion of a different perspective appearing to her makes sense from Fonda’s perspective. For
all she knows, she is Alpha, and how could any perspective other than Alpha’s appear to Alpha?
It is interesting to note that this argument is not entirely analogous to the corresponding argu-
ment regarding color appearance given earlier. It may be plausible to Fonda that the way colors
appear necessarily emerges from the laws of the universe in which she finds herself. But it seems
implausible that somehow Alpha’s perspective, to the exclusion of any other, necessarily emerges as
the “present” one from these laws, given that Alpha is just one agent among many similar ones as far
as these laws go.14 Instead, the argument here relies on the possibility of her complete identification
with Alpha.
Again, perhaps this all reduces to standard arguments about personal identity and the self. If
so, then again, this on the one hand suggests that the debate has been on the right track, while on
the other hand also casting a clearer lens on it. This is because unlike in standard scenarios in
the literature on personal identity and the self, here it is clearly true that Fonda “could have been
someone else”—i.e., she could have had a different agent’s perspective in the simulation displayed
to her on the VR system. This highlights, again, that the problem fundamentally has an important
epistemological component.
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Conclusion
How can we avoid concluding that further facts exist in Case C, which corresponds to our own
world? It seems that the approach most likely to succeed is to argue that, while in Case A the
conclusion of further facts is justified, it is not in Case B. Moreover, the most natural way to do so is
to counter the argument in favor of further facts in Case B in a way that is similar to how arguments
in favor of further facts in our own world (Case C) are often countered. But it appears that these
counterarguments lose at least some of their immediate intuitive appeal when moving from Case
C to Case B. This is because, by construction, there are in fact further facts in Case B, making it
difficult to point out where exactly the argument that further facts exist goes wrong. Moreover, this
argument is essentially the same as in Case A, where presumably we do believe the argument is
correct. Therefore, the counterargument needs to rely entirely on Fonda’s epistemic limitations in
Case B. Again, I believe that this is the most natural way to avoid the conclusion that further facts
exist. But I also believe that the counterargument is in need of further fleshing out. In any case, if
one agrees that Fonda’s situation in Case B is epistemically sufficiently like ours (Case C), so that
any arguments available to us against further facts should be available to Fonda in Case B as well,
we obtain a nontrivial conclusion. This is that we cannot know with certainty that qualia supervene
on the physical facts, because after all, (say) an inverted spectrum is genuinely possible in Case B.15
At most, one can argue that we have no good reason to believe that they fail to supervene on the
physical facts, and hence are not justified in concluding that there are further facts.
One may take other routes. I do not see how one could reasonably hold that Fonda’s argument
in Case A is flawed. On the other hand, perhaps one could successfully argue that there is a relevant
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difference in Fonda’s epistemic situation between Cases B and C. Of course, Case B is intended
to be epistemically as similar to Case C as possible, and for any remaining potentially relevant
epistemic difference between the two cases, it seems we can modify Case B appropriately to make
the difference go away. One might perhaps argue that Case B describes a scenario that is inherently
impossible—or at least that it would become so after sufficiently many of these modifications. But I
see no convincing reason to think so.16
Debates about further facts are ancient and clearly I have not settled them. I do believe that the
three cases presented here, besides putting a modern spin on these questions, help to disentangle
some of the different aspects relevant to these debates. They also allow us to treat different types of
further facts in a more uniform manner.
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Notes
1Due to the existence of the additional code, these further facts are in fact ontologically further facts, as opposed to
merely epistemologically further facts. For more on the distinction, see, e.g., Chalmers (2010a).
2See, e.g., Shoemaker (1982) and Block (1990). The literature on inverted spectrum (and closely related) scenarios,
their possibility, and their implications is, of course, vast. To keep the length of this paper reasonable and avoid distrac-
tion from the main issues, I will omit a detailed review of, and comparisons to, the specific scenarios and arguments in
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this literature. I hope that the reader familiar with this literature can easily fill in the blanks.
3For ease of exposition, I will assume that the laws of each universe are such that the initial conditions completely
determine the physical structure of the universe. However, this is not essential to the arguments in this paper.
4Whether one believes that these two questions get at the same issue will depend on one’s interpretation of them,
perhaps especially of the former. The former question has featured prominently in the literature on whether imagination
provides a reliable guide to possibility. Namely, if I can imagine myself being (say) Napoleon, then should we not
conclude that I could have been Napoleon? But it is difficult to make sense of this conclusion. One way to do so is
to interpret “I” as referring to a Cartesian self, and “Napoleon” as referring to an empirical self. See Williams (1973)
for discussion of these points, or Ninan (2016) for a more recent discussion and further references. Of course, most
contemporary philosophers will eschew such an interpretation. The latter question avoids Cartesian dualism by focusing
on the presence of the experience, rather than on which entity has the experience. This approach is closely related
to the theory of “egocentric presentism” proposed by Hare (2007, 2009) (see also Hare (2010) and the closely related
subjectivist theory laid out by Merlo (2016)), which is a subtle form of solipsism according to which only one human
being’s perspective is “present.” Other recent work on these questions includes that by Johnston (2011) (e.g., the section
“Am I Now Contingently Johnston?”, pages 151-154) and Hellie (2013), who discusses the “vertiginous question” of
why Hellie is the human being whose experiences appear “live.” Valberg (2007, page 62), in support of similar ideas,
discusses in detail the example of himself having a dream in which he occupies the perspective of someone other than
himself, even though he—meaning, Valberg—is one of the characters in the dream. (Ninan (2016) discusses similar
“Lakoff cases.”)
5Again, the literature addressing apparently related questions in the philosophy of time is vast, and I hope that the
reader familiar with this literature can easily draw the connections. For relatively recent references, see, e.g., Balashov
(2005); Zimmerman (2005); Olson (2009), and Skow (2011).
6It should be pointed out that the referent of “me” is not clear here. Since by assumption Fonda no longer remembers
her life outside the simulation and she feels identified with Alpha, one could argue that for the thought to make sense
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from her perspective, “me” should refer to Alpha, in which case we end up with the familiar uninteresting question of
why Alpha’s perspective (rather than Beta’s) should appear to Alpha. On the other hand, she could take “me” to refer to
some abstract observer, one that is difficult for her to identify, rather than a clearly identifiable agent in the (simulated)
universe. If she were to do so, it would make more sense for the referent to be Fonda, i.e., the human being wearing
the VR headset, even though she is no longer aware of the existence of such a human being. And then, the question
does have a nontrivial answer that involves the code governing the simulation and its display on the VR system. As yet
another alternative, we can just leave out “to me” altogether—that is why this phrase is in parentheses. Again, in this
particular context, this seems to be a sensible question with a nontrivial answer. (See also Endnote 13 on phenomenal
concepts.)
7Letting +X denote that her reasoning is sound in case X and −X that it is not, there are 23 = 8 combinations;
−A−B−C, −A−B+C, −A+B−C, and −A+B+C are covered (at least) under 1, +A−B−C and +A−B+C under 2,
+A+B−C under 3, and +A+B+C under 4. Alternatively, it is not hard to see that (for example) the negation of the
first three possibilities implies the fourth.
8By using the word “silently” I do not intend to take any stance on whether and in what sense there might be such a
thing as Alpha’s own experience; this is irrelevant to the arguments presented here, which concern Fonda’s experience.
See also Endnote 10.
9It is not required here that the code for running the simulation and the code governing the display are neatly
separated. Even if they are intermingled in horribly messy ways, somewhere in the code there must be commands of
roughly the following form:
display(x,y,z)
indicating that on the screen the pixel at coordinates x and y is to be given color z. Removing all (and only) these
commands will result in nothing being displayed, even though the simulation of the physics is running. Alternatively,
replacing z by z + 1 in every such command will result in all the displayed colors changing a bit.
Is it conceivable that the code was written (and, perhaps, for some reason had to be written) in a strange program-
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ming language that would prevent changing the colors? Or that the monitor for some reason (say) cannot display large
amounts of red at the same time, necessitating red to be used for a particular simulated wavelength? Perhaps, but it is
easy to argue that Fonda has strong reason to believe that a sensible programming language was used and that the moni-
tor does not have strange constraints. In any case, here, in Case A, we can simply sidestep these concerns by specifying
that Fonda knows the programming language and the type of monitor used.
10But then, could it similarly be the case that the relevant experience is Alpha’s, not Fonda’s? One can argue that
Alpha’s experience is fully determined by the simulated physics, so that no further facts are needed to explain Alpha’s
experience. However, this will not resolve the puzzle considered in this paper. It is not clear under what conditions
there is something it is like to be Alpha—that is, not to be someone to whom Alpha’s perspective is being displayed,
but to really be Alpha—but in any case this is irrelevant to the issues we investigate here. In Cases A and B as I have
specified them, the conclusions about further facts are reached by Fonda, not Alpha, on the basis of Fonda’s experience,
not Alpha’s. So Fonda’s experience is the relevant one. But, one might ask, is Fonda in Case C perhaps more similar to
Alpha in Case B than to Fonda in Case B? At least for some aspects of these three entities, this is surely true. Does this
mean that there is a gap between Cases B and C, and that to close the gap we should modify Case B to have Alpha, not
Fonda, conclude that there are further facts? No. For our purposes, it is not important that Fonda in Case B and Fonda
in Case C are similar in every aspect. All that matters is that their epistemic situations are similar across these cases. I
will discuss this in more detail in the section on Option 3. See also Endnote 6 on what the referent of “me” is.
11Neuroscience aside, in our own world we also observe, to some extent, how children learn to think. If there is
nothing analogous in the simulation, again this may raise suspicions about there being an “outside” world where the
ability to think rationally is acquired. Again, though, it does not seem difficult to modify the case appropriately, for
example with Fonda and perhaps others having been in the virtual reality system since childhood.
12One may ask whether this presupposes an internalist view of epistemic justification. Might an externalist not argue
that Fonda’s belief in further facts is justified in Case B but not in Case C, because whether her belief is justified hinges
on aspects of the external world? For one, it may be that in Case B, Fonda’s prior experiences outside the simulation
contributed causally to her current thoughts about further facts, even though she is not currently aware of this. (Examples
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in which one is not aware of exactly how one has come to believe something are common in the literature about internalist
vs. externalist views of epistemic justification; see, e.g., Goldman (2009).) If so, externalists, and even some internalists,
may consider Fonda’s belief in further facts justified in Case B but not in Case C. However, we can simply specify that
no such causal link exists in Case B—say, Fonda’s brain has rewired itself from scratch after entering the simulation.
Given this additional detail, it seems few externalists would hold that Fonda’s belief in further facts is justified in Case B
but not in Case C. For example, if we consider reliable process theory (see, e.g., Goldman (1979) for a classic version),
it is not clear in what sense the process leading to Fonda’s belief should be more reliable in Case B than in Case C.
13Of course, I do not claim that these examples have significant implications for every argument in the literature.
An exhaustive analysis of where they can provide insight is far beyond the scope of this paper, but, for instance, it
is instructive to reconsider phenomenal concepts (for a survey article, see Balog (2009)), and especially their role in
Chalmers’ work (see, e.g., Chalmers (1996, 2003)), in light of them. Even for this, a thorough analysis is beyond the
scope of this paper, but here is a sketch of how part of such an analysis might proceed.
Phenomenal concepts are taken to pick out phenomenal qualities. However, in the context of examples with sim-
ulations (Cases A and B), we can define analogous concepts that simply pick out the color displayed on the screen (as
opposed to the phenomenal color quality experienced by Fonda). Even in Case B Fonda could herself form such a con-
cept by means of imagination (“the color displayed on the screen assuming I am in a simulation”). Standard arguments,
including ones about the possibility of inverted spectra or zombies, can then be applied to these concepts instead of
the phenomenal ones, and may become less controversial (since, e.g., we know we can invert the colors on a screen).
Then again, they may have less bite. If all that such an argument allows Fonda to conclude in Case B is that an inverted
spectrum—in the limited sense of the colors on a screen being inverted—is possible if she is in a simulation, then it is
not clear how this by itself could justify an unconditional belief in the possibility of an inverted spectrum in the original
phenomenal sense. Fundamentally, the challenge for this approach seems to be that the new concepts are not infallible
in the way that phenomenal concepts are widely held to be, and, relatedly, that they do not refer to something that
can justify beliefs through acquaintance in the way that phenomenal qualities are widely held to be able to. (See also
Endnote 6 on what “me” could refer to for Fonda in Case B.)
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14To flesh this out, we may specify that all the agents in the simulation—Alpha, Beta, Gamma, . . . —are objectively
(from a standpoint within the simulation) extremely similar. Then, given that the (simulated) physical laws treat similar
agents similarly, these laws could not by themselves determine which agent’s perspective becomes the present (dis-
played) one. In contrast, the phenomenal properties of seeing blue are inherently different from those of seeing red, so
it does not seem possible to make a similar argument for the case of such qualia. Conceivably to Fonda in Case B, the
phenomenal properties of seeing blue are somehow inherently linked to the physical properties of certain wavelengths
in her environment.
15Unlike for standard conceivability arguments (see, e.g., Chalmers (2010b)), where a key issue is whether the jump
from conceivability to possibility can be made, it does not seem that possibility is at issue for Cases A and B. Our current
state of technology already enables at least Case A. As for Case B, I am not aware of anyone having ever become so
completely lost in a VR simulation, presumably at least in part due to remaining limitations of the technology. But this
technology is advancing rapidly with no apparent fundamental obstacles in its path. Hence, it is hard to see what could
keep Case B from being possible even in the near future. Moreover, inverting the spectrum or changing the identity of
the displayed agent is clearly possible in Cases A and B. Unless an epistemic line can be drawn between Cases B and
C, this seems to imply a strong type of epistemic possibility in our own case as well.
16See also Endnote 15.
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